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Abstract: The point of the paper is discussing whether the term ‘agency’ is 
useful for the study of interaction practices or whether instead it denotes a 
set of features which relate to an individualistic perspective from the point of 
view of a theory or social action, and a voluntaristic perspective from the 
point of view of a theory of language in action. The argument of the paper is 
that studying interaction does not require an individualistic and voluntaristic 
notion  of  social  action.  In  this  regard,  Goffman,  Garfinkel  and 
conversational  analysis  offer  an  alternative  approach  to  the  study  of 
interaction  practices  in  natural  settings.  This  reasoning  stems  from  data 
collected during research conducted on medical emergency call centres in 
Italy. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The notion of agency in its more recent 
version put forward by various strands of 
contemporary  sociological  theory  (after 
Parsons)  assumes  an  autonomous  and 
reflexive actor against the regularities and 
constrictions of the social structure. In face 
of  the  conformism  imposed  by  social 
structures, the notion of agency seemingly 
enables  the  introduction  of  elements  of 
creativity,  subjectivity,  and  choice  into 
everyday action. Social action is thus seen 
not  as  routine  and  predictable,  the 
persistent reproduction of structure, but a 
factive  and  conscious  contribution  by 
individuals  amid  the  unforeseen 
contingencies of the everyday social world. 
For those who analyze social interaction in 
particular the term „agency‟ seems to retain 
undeniable  theoretical  advantages 
(Emirbayer and Mische 1998). Instead of 
focusing  on  social  structures  (on 
persistence),  the  notion  of  „agency‟ 
emphasises  the  local,  micro,  constructive 
and individual dimension of social action. 
It  seems  to  be  a  term  suitable  for 
summarizing  the  processual  and  dynamic 
components of social interaction which a 
solely structural account fails to grasp. 
I  believe  instead  that  the  notion  of 
„agency‟–  inasmuch  as  it  refers  to  an 
individualistic  perspective  from  the  point 
of view of a theory of social action, or a 
voluntaristic perspective from the point of 
view of a theory of language in action – is 
not  a  useful  tool  for  the  study  of  social 
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counterposes  that  of  „structure‟;  it 
therefore  stipulates  and  creates  a 
dichotomy which has a long history in the 
social sciences (King 2004). The notion of 
agency obliges us to deal with individuals 
–  which is  not  the  solution  if interaction 
processes are being studied. But nor does 
the solution lie in the alternative to agency, 
namely  structure.  The  interesting  issue 
seems  to  consist  in  finding  a  way  to 
overcome this alleged dichotomy between 
agency  and  structure  so  that  social 
interactions can be studied from the point 
of view of their relative autonomy. 
In this regard, the work of Goffman with 
its  notion  of  interaction  order,  and  the 
work  of  Garfinkel  with  its  notion  of 
phenomenal  field,  both  represent  two 
formidable theoretical departure points for 
overcoming  the  theoretical  dichotomy 
between agency and structure. In regard to 
the  empirical  study  of  social  interaction, 
conversation  analysis  offers  the  most 
suitable  analytical  approach  and  the 
methodological  tools  with  which  to 
supersede the dichotomy. 
 
2. Objectives 
 
In this paper I would like to show how 
the  notion  of  agency  does  not  help  in 
understanding  the  processes  of  social 
interaction. The basis for my argument will 
be  data  collected  during  research  on 
medical emergency call & dispatch centres 
(telephone number 118 in Italy). My two 
main points of reference are the so called 
“workplace  studies”  (Heath  and  Luff 
2000),  (Heath,  Knoblauch  et  al.  2000), 
from  one  side;  and  the  studies  by 
Zimmerman  et  al.  on  the  social 
organization  of  emergency  calls  (Whalen 
and  Zimmerman  1987),  (Whalen  and 
Zimmerman  1990),  (Zimmerman  1984), 
(Zimmerman  1992b),  (Zimmerman 
1992a),  (Whalen  and  Zimmerman  2005) 
and  on  the  social  organization  of  the 
dispatch  (Whalen  1995)  and  (Whalen 
1995), from the other side. 
In this paper I would like to present that 
which seems to be a recurrent pattern of 
behaviour  in  the  interaction  among 
operators  who  work  together  in  the 
handling  of  emergency  cases.  I  shall 
analyse  in  particular  a  common  method 
used to send dispatches by the dispatcher, 
which consists in repeating out loud on the 
radio what is being communicated at the 
moment by the call-taker. This would seem 
to be a case of zero-agency where a person 
has  minimum  control  over  his/her 
behaviour and verbal production 
If  these  cases  are  examined  from  the 
point  of  view  of  interaction  processes, 
therefore  shifting  our  attention  from  an 
individual,  single  actor  to  the  relation 
between the parties and to the ecological 
context in which this relation takes place, 
matters  become  more  complicated.  What 
seems to be an example of zero-agency is 
in  fact  an  efficient  form  of  behaviour 
whereby  the  actors  contribute 
collaboratively  and  collectively  to  the 
ongoing activity. 
I shall conclude by arguing that only by 
keeping  into  consideration  the  system  of 
interaction, and therefore only renouncing 
an  individualist  and  voluntaristic 
perspective on social action, can one fully 
understand the complexity of the forms of 
social action. 
 
3. Material and Methods 
 
In  order  to  clarify  how  the  analysis  of 
interaction  can  dispense  with  an 
„ingenuous‟  notion  of  agency,  I  shall 
examine  a  specific  work  setting  and 
describe  one  emblematic  case.  The 
material  analysed  consists  of  video 
recordings  made  at  an  operations  centre 
which handles emergency calls to the 118 
telephone  number  in  a  region  of  
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two  operators  working  side  by  side  in  a 
room  which  takes  incoming  telephone 
requests  for  emergency  assistance.  The 
calls are fielded by a „call-taker‟. Once the 
relevant information has been acquired, a 
second person, the dispatcher, contacts the 
emergency  vehicle  crews  in  order  to 
organize the operation.  
 
Fig. 1. Call taker (foreground) and dispatcher (background)  
 
The excerpt I will analyze concerns the 
phase  when  the  emergency  vehicles  are 
dispatched. 
 
3.1. “It’s a wasp” 
 
The following extract is taken from the 
official recording of the dispatch: 
030902 “It’s a wasp” radio dispatch 
01     Attention five three one 
02     Yes go ahead 
03     Proceed in red 
04     to Dante square here in town 
05     where the monument is 
06     for an anaphylactic reaction 
07     Seems seriously ill. 
08     look a:h 
09     It’s a wasp. 
The dispatcher is the only one of the two 
operators  who  speaks.  He  performs  the 
dispatch  according  to  the  canonical 
procedure. In our case this is a dispatch of 
an  emergency  vehicle  to  assist  a  person 
stung by a wasp. 
If the dispatch is considered in terms of 
the utterance production format described 
by  Goffman  (Goffman  1979),  the  three 
figures identified by Goffman are involved 
in the delivery. The dispatcher is not only 
the sounding box or the talking machine, 
the  person  who  produces  the  sound 
message, he is also the message‟s author; 
moreover,  the  dispatcher  is  also  in  some 
way responsible for the message because 
he  is  the  person  at  the  operations  centre 
who officially contacts the vehicles on the 
ground. 
If we take Duranti‟s definition of agency 
(Duranti 2001), the dispatcher  appears to 
have  a  high  degree  of  control  over  his 
behaviour  (he  knows  states  of  the  world 
which he communicates authoritatively to 
another  person);  his  actions  strongly 
influence  other  entities  in  the  world  (he 
issues instructions to distant subjects that 
not  only  produce  cognitive  change  with 
respect to the previous knowledge state but 
are  also  outright  orders  to  act  in  a 
particular way); his actions are subject to 
assessment, in the sense that they not only 
generally  pertain  to  the  standard 
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task  but  are  of  direct  importance  for  a 
specific  task  at  a  specific  moment  in  a 
specific case. 
However, if we consider the ecological 
context  of  the  dispatch  more  broadly  by 
analysing  the  organization  of  the  work 
which enabled delivery of the dispatch, the 
definition  of  the  dispatcher‟s  presumed 
agency changes radically. There follows a 
transcription of the video recording made 
of the same few moments (the dispatch is 
in bold).  
 
030902 “It’s a wasp” Video dispatch 
01 CT     okay? 
02         bye, [see you ] 
03 Disp        [shall we send ] the ambulance car? 
04 CT     yes, in [ red ] 
05 Disp           [attention five three one ] 
06 CT     (he’s going up-),yes, meanwhile the ambulance car, yes. 
07 Radio    [yes go ahead] 
08 CT     in [Dante Square, >right near to the mo[nument< ] 
09 Disp                                          [proceed in red] 
10         to Dante Square here in town 
11         where the monument is, 
12 CT     for an anaphylactic 
13         [reaction::,   (apparently   serious)  ] 
14 Disp   [for an anaphylactic reaction apparently] serious 
15         (.) 
16         look a:h 
17         It’s a wasp. 
18 CT     hhhhhhhhhhh ((laughing)) 
19         the patient is a wasp ((laughing)) 
20         °hhhhh hhh °hhhh h h h 
21         “the eh- is seriously ill”, the wasp is ill 
22         °hhhh 
23 Disp   listen, I send after him the:, 
24         the [(----------) also] 
25 CT     [send the five] four eight 
01         yes:, (after) 
 
3.2. “No agency”? 
 
At the beginning of the extract, we find 
the two „actors‟ –  the call-taker and the 
dispatcher  –  at  the  moment  when  the 
emergency  call  is  going  to  be  concluded 
and the dispatch is about to be made. The 
call-taker is completing the telephone call 
requesting the intervention (lines 1 and 2). 
The  dispatcher  addresses  his  colleague 
before  she  has  completed  both  the 
telephone  call  and  her  turn  (note  the 
overlap between the call-takers turn at line 
2 and the dispatcher‟s turn at line 3). The 
dispatcher has heard the telephone call, but 
he does not have access to the information 
that the caller has  given to the call-taker 
(the speakerphone is not enabled). He has 
heard  only  what  the  call-taker  repeated 
aloud during the conversation. 
As well known in the literature, this is a 
formidable  source  of  orientation  for  all 
those  present  in  the  setting,  in  that  a 
colleague‟s repetitions aloud and questions 
make publicly available – „in the air‟ so to 
speak  –  salient  elements  of  the 
communication  which  may  have 
procedurally  important  consequences  for 
the subsequent actions of other colleagues 
(Heath  and  Luff  1996)  e  (Goodwin  and 
Goodwin 1996). I shall not dwell on this 
aspect of the operators‟ work (which is not 
given  in  the  extract).  I  merely  point  out 
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next  relevant  action  (sending  the 
ambulance car, line 3) without being given 
any  explicit  instructions.  The  dispatcher 
performs  his  turn  in  interrogative  form 
(shall we send the ambulance car?): that 
is, his turn projects a pertinent action by 
his colleague which consists in confirming 
or  disconfirming  the  proposal.  The  
call-taker,  who  has  just  closed  the 
telephone  call,  immediately  answers  her 
colleague  (line  4),  agreeing  with  his 
proposal (line 4, yes, means “I confirm that 
in this case the ambulance car should be 
sent”) and adding another crucial element 
to  the  dispatch  delivery,  namely  the 
urgency  of  the  event.  In  this  case,  the 
gravity of the incident is indicated by its 
being flagged as “red” (line 4: yes, in red). 
The  operation  code  must  now  be 
communicated  to  the  crew  of  the 
ambulance car. 
What one sees in action throughout the 
extract are two systems of communication. 
The  first  is  the  face-to-face  interaction 
between  the  two  operators  in  the  call 
centre, the communication of information 
relevant  to  the  intervention  between  the 
call-taker and the dispatcher; the second is 
the  interaction  mediated  by  the  radio 
communications  system  which  connects 
the dispatcher in the dispatch centre with 
the emergency crews on the ground. 
The  dispatcher  contacts  an  ambulance 
(number  531,  line  5)  even  before  the  
call-taker has completed her turn. [1] The 
communication between the call-taker and 
the dispatcher proceeds in parallel with the 
communication between the dispatcher and 
the  ambulance  car  crew.  The  call-taker 
sequentially  produces,  item  by  item,  the 
information  needed  by  the  dispatcher  to 
deliver the dispatch. The dispatcher merely 
relays,  almost  automatically,  the 
information  as  he  receives  it  from  the  
call-taker.  The  latter  tells  the  dispatcher 
where the incident has occurred (line 8:  In 
Dante  Square,  right  near  to  the 
monument), which is the place where the 
ambulance  car  should  head.  In  the 
dispatcher‟s  hands  (or  better  his  voice), 
this information furnished by the call-taker 
becomes  an  instruction  issued  to  the 
ambulance car. 
The  dispatcher  resumes  radio 
communication  with  the  ambulance  car 
even  before  the  call-taker  has  completed 
her  turn.  The  dispatcher  begins  the 
dispatch by stating the urgency code of the 
incident  (line  9:  proceed  in  red)  as  just 
previously defined by the call-taker (line 4) 
and then tells the ambulance car where it 
should  go  (lines  10-11:  to  Dante  Square 
here in town, where the monument is) as 
the  call-taker  has  described  it  in  her 
immediately previous turn. 
At  this  point,  the  dispatcher‟s  turn 
addressed  to  the  ambulance  car  crew  is 
suspended.  The  call-taker  has  shifted  her 
attention  from  her  colleague  to  the 
computer screen in front of her. She is now 
logging the incident data in the call centre 
database. At this perceived suspension, [2] 
although  the  call-taker  does  not  interrupt 
her task (completing the computer form) or 
change  her  posture  (she  is  facing  the 
computer  screen  with  her  hands  on  the 
keyboard), she provides her colleague with 
the information that he requires (line 12: 
For  an  anaphylactic  reaction, apparently 
serious).  Before  the  call-taker‟s  turn  has 
ended,  the  dispatcher  resumes  the 
communication via radio and repeats word 
by word the information that the call-taker 
has  just  given  him  (line  13:  For  an 
anaphylactic reaction, apparently serious). 
The dispatch concludes with description of 
the  cause  of  the  anaphylactic  reaction 
(lines 15-16: look a:h, it’s a wasp). This 
information arouses the call-taker‟s joking 
aside that the dispatcher has formulated the 
information so that it seems that the victim 
is a wasp (lines 17-22). 
If we consider this extract from the point 
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therefore consider each actor individually 
in terms of his/her ability to control his/her 
behaviour,  the  way  in  which  his/her 
actions have consequences for other actors, 
and  possible  assessment  of  the  action 
performed – we would think of an evident 
asymmetry  of  knowledge,  power  and 
control. The dispatcher resembles a simple 
sounding box which repeats item-by-item 
over the radio the information provided by 
the  call-taker.  [3]  Only  the  call-taker 
appears to be the repository of information: 
she  decides  the  gravity  of  the  incident; 
only she has the relevant information; she 
is  the  author  of  the  dispatcher‟s 
communication, and she is responsible for 
it. The dispatcher seemingly acts only as a 
„ventriloquist‟s dummy‟. 
However, matters change if we examine 
the  extract  in  terms  of  the  interaction 
system. Just as examination of the official 
record of the dispatch (the transcript of the 
radio communication alone) does not bring 
out  the  collective  collaboration  which 
makes  the  work  at  the  emergency  
call-centre  possible,  so  an  approach 
centred  exclusively  on  agency  fails  to 
grasp  how  the  interaction  system  works. 
Only by analysing the situation as a whole 
is  it  possible  to  appreciate  the  subtle 
coordination work performed by physically 
co-present  actors  engaged  in  a  common 
task. From this point of view, it does not 
make  a  great deal of sense to talk of an 
actor‟s greater or lesser freedom of action 
unless  consideration  is  made  of  the 
constant  work  of  reciprocal  adjustment 
performed by the participants in order to 
anticipate each other‟s relevant actions and 
possible future moves. 
 
3.3. Coordination and collaboration 
 
The  dispatcher‟s  initial  turn  (at  line  3) 
begins while her colleague is still dealing 
with the telephone request for assistance. 
The  structure  of  the  turn  shows  that 
anticipation  of  the  alternative  actions 
possible  at  this  point  (shall  we  send  the 
ambulance car?) is not a generic question 
(like, for instance, what can we do now?). 
Coordination between the parties assumes 
a  markedly  temporal  and  sequential 
character.  The  call-taker  furnishes  the 
information  items  required  by  the 
dispatcher  (the  gravity  of  the  incident; 
where it has occurred; what has happened) 
in  positions  immediately  antecedent  to 
their relevance for the dispatch  – that is, 
the  work  being  performed  by  the 
dispatcher on the radio (line 4; line 8; line 
12). The call-taker‟s information items are 
sequentially  positioned:  they  are  not 
packaged  into  a  single  communication 
format  but  they  match  step-by-step  the 
sequence of the communication going on 
via radio. The call-taker subtly guides the 
dispatcher  by  slightly  anticipating  the 
information  content,  positioning  it  at  the 
appropriate point and waiting for the next 
slot  in  which  to  insert  the  next  item  of 
information.  The  dispatcher  for  his  part 
systematically  anticipates  his  colleague‟s 
turn in order to speak on the radio, thereby 
establishing the rhythm of the face-to-face 
interaction.  At  the  same  time  he  elicits 
further information from the call-taker by 
stopping at the appropriate point (e.g. line 
11),  thereby  orienting  her  attention  and 
obtaining  the  further  information.  The 
intonation pattern of the dispatcher‟s turn 
(rising tone, line 11) indicates to the call-
taker  that  the  dispatch  has  not  been 
completed  and  that  a  further  item  of 
information is required. All this takes place 
within  the  time-frame  of  the  ongoing 
emergency  event.  Hence  every  decision 
about  what  to  do  and  how  to  do  it  is 
compressed:  decisions  must  be  taken 
immediately; knowing what to do must be 
almost entirely co-extensive with its being 
done. 
The  system  of  the  ongoing  interaction 
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important  temporal  compression  of  the 
event,  and  of  the  type  of  work  normally 
performed in contexts of this kind. Direct 
communication  about  the  event  between 
the  two  operators  overlaps  with  the 
communication  (mediated  and  at  a 
distance) between one of the operators and 
the ambulance car. The transfer of relevant 
information  from  the  call-taker  (the 
informant) to the dispatcher (the informee) 
does  not  precede  the  phase  when  the 
dispatcher  issues  instructions  to  the 
ambulance  car  crew.  The  information  is 
not first „received‟ and then „codified‟ and 
transformed into instructions. The process 
takes  place  almost  instantaneously.  It  is 
fluid and efficient: no pause or interruption 
breaks  the  flow  of  the  collective  action. 
The  outcome  is  a  complex  and 
interconnected  system  of  professional 
practices  produced  within  the  imposed 
time-frame, where the temporal dimension 
is  both  „external‟  to  the  interaction  (the 
event‟s  nature  as  an  emergency)  and 
internal to it. 
These are some aspects that an approach 
centred  only  on  agency,  of  individualist 
and  voluntaristic  type,  seems  unable  to 
grasp to their full extent. 
 
4. Results and discussions 
 
The work of Goffman, ethnomethodology, 
and conversation analysis can be considered 
for  a  dissolution  of  the  agency/structure 
dichotomy (Giglioli 1990), (Rawls 2003). 
Goffman‟s work in its entirety is devoted 
to analysing social interaction, or in other 
words,  situations  in  which  at  least  two 
persons  are  present  (Goffman  1964). 
Goffman  is  not  interested  in  individuals 
(even  less  in  social  groups);  rather  he 
analyses  social  interaction,  that  is,  the 
behaviour  of  people  when  they  are  in 
immediate  physical  co-presence  –  people 
who may not know each other and may not 
share  any  substantial  beliefs.  Goffman‟s 
starting-point  is  not  psychology  but  the 
rules that regulate how people address each 
other in face-to-face interaction. His most 
innovative  input  to  sociological  tradition 
consists in his contention that face-to-face 
interaction  is  an  autonomous  order  of 
phenomena which cannot be explained by 
resorting either to individual psychology or 
to  the  socio-economic  structures  that 
sociology  uses  to  explain  large-scale 
phenomena. 
Goffman  maintains  that  if  we  consider 
the  specific  social  setting  of  talking,  for 
instance, we find that this setting is subject 
to its own „rules‟ and is to some extent free 
from the restrictions and constraints of the 
broader  social  structure  (Goffman  1964). 
This specific social setting is the situation 
–  a  context  of  interaction  in  which 
systemic  relations  of  mutual  influence 
apply even between those who speak and 
those who do not, or among onlookers who 
are not ratified participants in the situation. 
Like  Goffman,  also  ethnomethodology 
gives much importance to social relations 
in co-presence. But the crucial aspect for 
ethnomethodology is the work performed 
by  co-members  in  order  to  make  their 
action  comprehensible  to  others,  not  the 
choreographic  work  that  they  perform  to 
ritually  honour  the  selves  of  the  
co-participants  (Garfinkel  2002).  This  is 
above  all  work  involving  collective 
orientation in the situation and perception 
of  the  salient  features  of  what  is 
happening. This collective orientation and 
perception of the situation have nothing to 
do  with  conscious  and  alert  individuals 
with  full  control  over  conditions  and  the 
environment. As Schutz stresses, as well as 
numerous  ethnomethodological  studies, 
communication  in  action,  mutual 
understanding,  and  the  sharing  of  a 
common  basis  for  action  depend  on  a 
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understanding  and  perception  in  context 
without  these  extending  beyond  the 
conscious  domain  (Schütz  1944).  The 
gestures  and  actions  of  a  musician,  for 
example  (Schütz  1951),  are  public 
instructions on what he is about to do, and 
they are considered (unconsciously) by the 
other musicians in order to anticipate what 
he  will  do  next.  According  to  Schutz, 
similar  phenomena  occur  in  conversation 
as well. 
A large part of the work of conversation 
analysts  consists  in  documenting  the 
important  role  of  even  very  subtle  and 
delicate aspects of interaction in orienting 
our  perceptions  and  directing  our 
understanding when we talk to someone. 
Broadly  speaking,  if  we  want  to  study 
interaction processes, the notion of agency 
seems to be a classic „red herring‟ (Loyal 
and Barnes 2001) in that it induces us to 
focus on an individual acting subject rather 
than  consider  the  systemic  dimension  of 
interaction  processes.  Thus  attributed  to 
the  individual  acting  subject  is  a  control 
and decision power which is described as 
features of his/her subjective and reflexive 
deliberation when they instead to a large 
extent pertain to the situation. The matter 
cannot  be  resolved  by  positing  different 
degrees of agency, or the subject‟s greater 
or  lesser  freedom  of  choice  among 
different behaviours. The subjects engaged 
in  an  interaction  do  not  simply  have  an 
audience which witnesses a performance; 
they  are  involved  in  mechanisms  of 
expectation and feedback, anticipation and 
retroaction,  which  are  locally  and 
temporally  situated.  These  „homeostatic‟ 
mechanisms  concern  all  the  persons  who 
are  physically  co-present.  The  level  of 
reciprocal  integration  and  collective 
coordination increases when these persons 
are  not  only  physically  co-present  but 
share a common purpose by performing an 
activity in concert. 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper I maintain that the notion of 
agency  is  inadequate  for  the  analysis  of 
interaction  processes.  Agency  may  be 
considered  a  resource  by  members  of  a 
culture who use it to explain and describe 
forms  of  intentionality,  creativity  and 
choice  by  themselves  of  other  members; 
[4] but it does not seem to me an analytical 
notion  that  can  be  used  by  a  social 
researcher  studying  processes  of 
interaction. That said, I hope that the scope 
of this paper is now clear. “Doing without 
agency”  does  not  refers  to  the  work  of 
emergency call-centre operators. It is not 
they who forgo agency:  it is the analyst. It 
is not that the operators – and in the cases 
described  the  dispatcher  in  particular  – 
display  „gregarious‟  and  „passive‟ 
behaviour. Some cases may appear to be 
examples of agency-zero in which a person 
has  a  minimal  degree  of  control  over 
his/her  behaviour  and  verbal  output  –  a 
person  who  repeats  word-for-word  what 
others  say;  a  sort  of  „ventriloquist‟s 
dummy‟,  a  sounding  board  without 
responsibility or authorship. It is not this 
that emerges. But at the same time I do not 
wish  to  stress  the  creative  and  ingenious 
nature  of  their  behaviour  without 
acknowledging  the  behaviour  of  their 
colleagues,  the  tasks  that  they  are 
performing,  and  the  ecological  setting  of 
their  action.  Taking  account  of  these 
aspects shifts the analytical focus from the 
individual and his/her strategies of action 
to the broader context of situation and the 
syntactic relations among  the participants 
in the interaction. 
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Notes 
 
[1] This call corresponds to the summons 
issued by the ring of the telephone. 
[2] I  call  it  a  „perceived  perception‟ 
because  the  dispatch  is  clearly  not 
concluded.  The  items  in  the  dispatch 
consist  of  the  urgency  code  for  the 
incident,  the  place  where  it  has 
occurred,  and  therefore  where  the 
ambulance car should go, and the type 
of incident.  One element is obviously 
still  missing:  the  perception  of  a 
suspension.  That  this  is  a  suspension 
perceived not by the analyst but by the 
actors themselves is evident from the 
rest of the interaction. 
[3] Goffman  says  that  the  speaker  in  a 
sense of a “sounding box” “can share 
this  physical  function  with  a 
loudspeaker  system  or  a  telephone”  
(p. 144). 
[4] The  distinction  between  topic  and 
resource  is  long-standing  feature  of 
ethnomethodology  (Zimmerman  & 
Pollner 1971). 
 